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Abstract
This paper shows how a Merton-model approach can be used to develop mea-
sures of the probability of failure of individual quoted UK companies. Probability
estimates are then constructed for a group of failed companies and their proper-
ties as leading indicators of failure assessed. Probability estimates of failure for
a control group of surviving companies are also constructed. These are used in
Probit-regressions to evaluate the information content of the Merton-based esti-
mates relative to information available in company accounts and in assessing Type
I and Type II errors. We also look at power curves and accuracy ratios. The paper
shows that there is much useful information in the Merton-style estimates.
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11 Introduction
The quantitative modelling of credit risk initiated by Merton (1974) shows how the prob-
ability of company default can be inferred from the market valuation of companies. This
paper employs a Merton-style approach to estimate default risk for public non-ﬁnancial
UK companies and assesses the reliability of these estimates using a range of diﬀerent
techniques.
The original Merton model is based on some simplifying assumptions about the struc-
ture of the typical ﬁrm’s ﬁnances. The event of default is determined by the market value
of the ﬁrm’s assets in conjunction with the liability structure of the ﬁrm. When the value
of the assets falls below a certain threshold (the default point), the ﬁrm is considered to
be in default. A critical assumption is that the event of default can only take place at
the maturity of the debt when the repayment is due. In order to implement the model in
practical situations, this paper shows how this assumption can be modiﬁed to allow for
default to occur at any point in time and not necessarily at maturity.
KMV Corporation1 also uses the broad Merton approach to estimate the probability of
ﬁrm failure in a number of diﬀerent countries over a range of diﬀerent forecast horizons.
But the KMV approach does not rely solely on an analytical Merton model. Instead, it
uses the Merton framework to estimate the “distance-to-default” of an individual com-
pany and then uses a proprietary data-base of US company histories to map this into
an “expected default frequency” (EDF), estimated by the proportion of companies with
a given distance to default that have failed in practice.2 By contrast, the calculations
reported here use only publicly available information on market prices and time series
estimates of parameters to measure the probability of default.
A key concern is that the estimated probabilities of failure are both reliable and eﬃ-
cient. This paper assesses the reliability of the estimates by examining their success in
predicting the failure or survival of both failed companies and survivors. The eﬃciency of
the estimates is assessed by testing the extent to which the predictive power of the esti-
mates could be improved by incorporating other information publicly available in company
accounts. Models that combine a Merton approach with additional ﬁnancial information
are referred in the literature as “hybrid models”. Sobehart and Keenan (2001) provide
an excellent summary of this class of models.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the literature on equity-
based models of ﬁrm default. Section 3 shows how the original Merton model may be
extended so that it can be implemented in practice. Section 4 outlines how the model
may be tested. Section 5 describes the data on UK quoted companies and the sample
1Moody’s has recently acquired KMV Corporation. The combined business of Moody’s Risk Manage-
ment Services and KMV is called Moody’s KMV. Throughout this paper we use the terms KMV and
Moody’s to refer to the KMV Corporation and Moody’s, respectively, before this acquisition took place.
2For a review of the KMV approach see Kealhofer and Kurbat (2002).
2that is used in constructing estimates of failure. Section 6 sets out the results. Section 7
concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a wide range of papers studying aggregate company defaults. Here we concen-
trate on those papers that adopt a structural or hybrid approach. The analysis by the
KMV Corporation and Moody’s are the most well known. See Nandi (1998) for a more
extensive discussion of models for valuing ﬁnancial instruments that are subject to default
risk.
Crosbie and Bohn (2002) summarise KMV’s default risk model. This is based on a
modiﬁed version of the Black-Scholes-Merton framework that “assumes the ﬁrm’s equity
is a perpetual option with the default point acting as the absorbing barrier for the ﬁrm’s
asset value. When the asset value hits the default point, the ﬁrm is assumed to default.”
There are essentially three steps in the determination of the default probability. The ﬁrst
step is to estimate the asset value and volatility from the market value and volatility of
equity and the book value of liabilities using their Merton approach. Second, the distance-
to-default is calculated using the asset value and asset volatility. And ﬁnally, a default
database of US incidents of default is used to derive an empirical distribution relating the
distance-to-default to a default probability.
Sobehart, Stein, Mikityanskaya and Li (2000), from Moody’s, construct a hybrid de-
fault risk model for US non-ﬁnancial public ﬁrms. Moody’s model provides a one-year
estimated default probability using a variant of Merton’s option theoretic model, Moody’s
rating (when available), company ﬁnancial statement information, additional equity mar-
ket information and macroeconomic variables.
As with the KMV model, the variant of the Merton model applied by Sobehart et al.
(2000) is not used directly to calculate default probabilities but rather to calculate the
market value and volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets from equity prices. These inputs are used
to derive the “distance to default”, the number of standard deviations that the value of
the ﬁrm’s assets must drop in order to reach the default point. Moody’s combine this
information into a logistic regression to obtain some default probabilities that are further
adjusted to correct for the fact that their in-sample data set had a slightly diﬀerent pro-
portion of defaulting-to-non-defaulting obligors from that observed in reality. According
to the authors there appears to be a signiﬁcant jump in performance as one moves from
pure statistical models to those that include structural information. Interestingly, there is
also a large gap between the pure structural model (Merton model) and Moody’s hybrid
model. The gap would represent the gain in accuracy derived from ﬁnancial statement
and rating data.
Kealhofer and Kurbat (2002) (KMV) try to replicate Moody’s empirical results (Sobehart
et al. (2000)) on the Merton approach. They obtain contrary results. The Merton ap-
3proach outperforms Moody’s ratings and various accounting ratios in predicting default.
Kealhofer and Kurbat (2002) explain this discrepancy by the fact that their implementa-
tion of the Merton model is more accurate than Moody’s approach. This greater accuracy,
according to the authors, come from the special approaches developed to estimate asset
volatility.
3 Implementation of the Merton Model
The basic insight of the Merton (1974) model is that the pay-oﬀs to the shareholders of
a ﬁrm are very similar to the pay-oﬀs had they purchased a call option on the value of
the ﬁrm with a strike price given by the amount of debt outstanding. As such, the option
pricing techniques of Black and Scholes (1973) may be used to estimate the value of the
option and the underlying probability of default.
The Merton model and the variation of the Merton model adopted in this paper as-
sume a simple capital structure for the ﬁrm: debt plus equity. We denote the notional
amount of debt by B, with (T ¡ t) being the time to maturity, the value of the ﬁrm is
At, and F(A;T;t) is the value of the debt at time t. The equity value at t is denoted by
f(A;t). Then, we can write the value of the ﬁrm At as:
At = F(A;T;t) + f(A;t) (1)
The original Merton model assumes that the ﬁrm promises to pay B to the bondholders
at maturity T. If this payment is not met, that is, if the value of the ﬁrm is less than
B, the bondholders take over the company and the shareholders receive nothing. Fur-
thermore, the ﬁrm is assumed not to issue any new senior claims nor pay cash dividends
nor repurchase shares prior to the maturity of the debt. Under these assumptions the
shareholders are eﬀectively long a European call option on the value of the ﬁrm.
This paper relaxes the assumption that default (or insolvency) can only occur at the
maturity of the debt. The model developed here assumes that insolvency occurs the ﬁrst
time that assets falls short of the redemption value of debt. In other words, insolvency
occurs the ﬁrst time that the value of the ﬁrm falls below the default point.
To model this we use the concept of a barrier option.3 Barrier options are options where
the payoﬀ depends on whether the underlying asset price reaches a certain level during
a certain period of time. A down-and-out call option is one type of knock-out option.
It is a regular call option that ceases to exist if the asset price reaches a certain level,
the barrier. The barrier level is below the initial asset price. The owner of a knock-out
option receives a prespecifed, nonnegative, cash payment (the rebate) if the underlying
asset price breaches the barrier prior to expiration.
3Other equity-based models of credit risk that use the concept of barrier options are Black and Cox
(1976), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) and Briys and de Varenne (1997).
4To derive the probability of default using a barrier option we suppose that the value
of the ﬁrm’s underlying assets follows the following stochastic process:
dA = ¹AAdt + ¾AAdz (2)
where dz = "
p
dt and " » N[0;1]
and we assume a non-stochastic process for the liabilities:
dL = ¹LLdt (3)
Let us denote the asset-liability ratio by k:
k = A=L (4)
Default occurs when k falls below the default trigger or default point called k at any time
within a given period. To estimate this probability of default we need to model how k
changes over time.4 Diﬀerentiate (4) to obtain
dk = (¹A ¡ ¹L)kdt + ¾Akdz
and deﬁne:
¹A ¡ ¹L = ¹k
¾A = ¾k
The values for ¹k and ¾k are needed to calculate the probabilities of default. Maximum
likelihood techniques are used to obtain estimates of those two parameters.5
4 Testing the Model
To test the performance of the Merton approach adopted in this paper, we calculate the
probabilities of default (PDs) implied by our model for a sample of UK non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
that includes a number of defaulters.6 We then do three types of tests: (1) we evaluate
our model against the actual default experience; (2) we compare our model with other
default models; and (3) we use measures of statistical power based on power curves and
accuracy ratios.
For the ﬁrst type of test, we compare the PD proﬁles for a subsample of defaulters
with the timing of actual defaults to assess the accuracy of the model in predicting those
failures. We also calculate the Type I and II errors. Ideally we want both type of errors
4Note that the value of the ﬁrm’s assets, A, is unobservable and hence so is the k ratio. What we can
observe is the equity-liability ratio (y). Nickell and Perraudin (2002), page six, derive a mapping between
the equity-liability ratio and the value of the ﬁrm’s assets-liability ratio that this paper borrows.
5The equations used to calculate these probabilities of default are derived in Tudela and Young (2002).
6We describe the composition of the sample in the section below.
5to be small, but clearly there is a trade-oﬀ between the two.
For the second type of test, we compare our model with other approaches. To com-
pare the performance of our Merton approach with the information content of company
account data only, we estimate a probit model. The dependent variable is a dummy that
takes on the value of unity if the company went bankrupt, and zero otherwise, and regres-
sors are company account indicators. To select the company account variables included
in the probit estimations we follow Geroski and Gregg (1997), one of the most compre-
hensive empirical studies of the determinants of company default in the UK. To compare
the accuracy of both models we calculate Type I and II errors.
The power of the PDs in explaining company default is assessed formally against other
models by testing for their signiﬁcance when added to the estimated probit model above.
If the coeﬃcient of the PD variable is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, we can conclude
that the Merton approach here implemented adds value to the company account variables.
For the third type of test, following Kocagil, Escott, Glormann, Malzkom and Scott
(2002), we use power curves and accuracy ratios to assess the statistical power of the
models. Both testing tools evaluate the accuracy of a model in ranking defaulters and
non-defaulters using the estimated probabilities of default. To plot a power curve, for a
given model we rank the companies in our sample by risk score (PD) from the riskiest
to the safest (horizontal axis). For a given percentage of this sample we calculate the
number of defaulters included in that percentage as a proportion of the total number
of defaulters in our sample (vertical axis). Thus for a sample in which one per cent of
companies default, a perfect model would include all the defaulters within the riskiest
percentile. By contrast, in a random model the ﬁrst percentile would tend to include only
one per cent of the defaulters and its power curve would be represented by a 45 degree
line. The better the model at ranking companies the more bowed towards the upper-left
corner its power curve would be. The power curve is sample dependent in that its shape
is dependent on the proportion of companies in the sample that default.
The accuracy ratio, even if less visual, gives a single statistic that summarises the in-
formation content of the power curve. The accuracy ratio has values that rank from zero
per cent (random model) to 100 per cent (perfect model) and it is deﬁned as the ratio of
the area between the power curves of the actual and random models to the area between
the power curves of the perfect and random models.
5 Sample and Data Description
The model presented in Section 3 is estimated for a sample of UK non-ﬁnancial quoted7
companies. Speciﬁcally, we collect 7,459 ﬁnancial statements from 1990 to 2001, 65 of
7Clearly, we cannot directly apply the model to private companies given the data requirements: we
need equity market capitalisation series.
6which correspond to ﬁrm defaults.8 The sample of failed companies was constructed
collecting news from FT.com about companies that went into receivership. The sample
constructed in this manner was checked against the “deaduk” dataset in Thompson Fi-
nancial Datastream and the “Companies House” website. The default date was selected
as being the last day in which an equity price movement was observed. This may be not
the exact date of default but it is a good approximation given the discrepancy and/or
inaccuracy observed in the diﬀerent sources consulted and the diﬃculty of deﬁning a de-
fault date.
Table 1 disaggregates the number of failures and non-failures by year for the sample we use
in the estimations (and for the sample we initially gathered for illustration purposes). It
is immediately apparent that defaults are concentrated in 1990–92 i.e. the recession years.
All our data are downloaded from Thompson Financial Datastream. To estimate the
PDs we use market capitalisation and liability data. Total liabilities are deﬁned as total
assets minus total share capital and reserves and short-term liabilities are deﬁned as cur-
rent liabilities. Following the ﬁndings of Crosbie and Bohn (2002) that the asset value
at which a ﬁrm defaults generally lies somewhere between total liabilities and current
liabilities, the liability measure that we use is 50 per cent of long-term liabilities (total
liabilities minus short-term liabilities) plus all short-term liabilities.
The PDs are estimated on a weekly basis using a ﬁve-year rolling window. Moreover, we
do not include in the maximisation procedure those observations when a dividend pay-out
was made. This is to avoid any uninformative jump in equity prices. The dividend pay-
ments dates are also obtained from Datastream. The equity data (market capitalisation)
are weekly data,9 but the liability data are annual. In order to generate the necessary
weekly liability data we use cubic spline interpolation routines. The PDs are calculated
for diﬀerent time horizons, from one year to ﬁve years, but here we concentrate on one-
year and two-year PDs.
In order to estimate the competing probit models we need company account data, in
particular, proﬁt margins, the ratio of debt to total assets, the ratio of cash to liabilities,
the number of employees and sales growth. Proﬁt margins are deﬁned as EBITDA relative
to sales and we further construct three binary (0,1) dummy variables10 for negative proﬁt
margins, proﬁt margins between zero and three per cent, and proﬁt margins between
three and six per cent. The debt to assets ratio is deﬁned as gross debt (borrowing of
maturity less than a year plus capital loans with maturity greater than one year) relative
to total assets. The cash to liabilities ratio is the ‘total cash and equivalent’ variable from
Datastream relative to liabilities as deﬁned above.
8Initially, we identify 76 ﬁrm defaults but due to the lack of some company account data needed for
our econometric speciﬁcations we use 65 to present comparable results across estimations.
9Actually, it is daily data but we use Wednesdays only to avoid any day-of-the-week eﬀect.
10Following Geroski and Gregg (1997).
7Apart from the company account data, we have also included some year dummies and/or
a macroeconomic indicator11 (GDP) in our probit estimates to account for the general
economic situation. The macroeconomic data are obtained from the electronic version of
the International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund.
6 Results
6.1 Implied Probabilities of Default
As an initial way of measuring the accuracy of our Merton approach, we ﬁrst compare the
PDs of defaulting and non-defaulting companies. For defaulting companies, we calculate
the 1-year ahead PD in each month of the twelve months prior to default and take the
simple average of these PDs as a measure of the default probability. This is what we call
1-year PD annual average. For non-defaulting companies, we take a simple average of
the 1-year ahead PDs in each month of the preceding calendar year. We investigate the
sensitivity of our results to these deﬁnitions below.
The usefulness of the estimated default probabilities generated by the model can be as-
sessed by examining the Type I and II errors for diﬀerent failure thresholds (see results in
Table 2). The lower the failure threshold, the smaller the Type I error (i.e. the proportion
of companies classiﬁed as survivors that failed), but at the expense of a greater Type II
error. As shown in Table 2, for the entire sample, choosing a failure threshold of ﬁve per
cent, we fail to classify as defaulters 4.6 per cent of companies that went bankrupt. At
this level, the Type I error is zero for eight of the years considered. The corresponding
Type II error for the whole sample is 19.9 per cent of non-defaulting companies. If we
increase the failure threshold to a PD greater or equal than ten per cent, then 9.2 per
cent of our population of defaulters had not been classiﬁed as defaulters. But in this case,
the Type II error is lower at 15 per cent.
We perform a test for the equality of 1-year PD means between the defaulters group
and the non-defaulters group. The 1-year PD average for the defaulter group is 47.33, for
the non-defaulter group it is 5.44. The null hypothesis is that the diﬀerence of the two
means equals zero. Under the alternative of this diﬀerence being diﬀerent from zero, we
reject the null at the one per cent level of signiﬁcance.
To check further the accuracy of the model we calculate the Type I and II errors for
the 2-year PD annual average (deﬁned as the average of the 2-year PDs, —the probability
of default in two years time from now— from the 12th month before the default month to
the 24th before the default month) and for the 1-year PD for the twelfth month before the
default month. This last measure is very strict in the sense that it gathers information for
one month only, whereas the other measures compile the information content of twelve
months.
11Several macroeconomic variables were tested and ﬁnally we decided on GDP (see Section 6).
8As expected, for the same thresholds, the Type I errors are bigger for the latter mea-
sures. For a ﬁve per cent threshold the Type I error for the 2-year PD annual average
is 6.1 per cent, and for the 1-year PD as deﬁned above is 24.6 per cent. To check if the
latter is a spurious result, we calculate the Type I error for a ﬁve per cent cut-oﬀ for the
1-year PD for the eleventh month before the default month, the tenth, and so on until the
seventh month before the default month. The Type I error for these measures are 16.9,
18.5, 16.9, 13.8 and 10.8 per cent, respectively. These ﬁgures are more in line with the
results obtained for the 1-year and 2-year PD annual averages, indicating that the ﬁgure
of 24.6 per cent is spurious. One, therefore, should always look at PDs for more than one
month and relative to recent history.
By way of illustration and to assess the model’s ability to reﬂect credit risk at the in-
dividual ﬁrm, Figure 1 represents 1-year and 2-year PDs (monthly averages) for those
companies that failed in 1992.12 The black line is the 1-year PD, that is, the probability
of default in one year time in a given month. The grey curve is the 2-year PD, the prob-
ability of default in two years time in a given month. The dashed(dotted) vertical line
cuts the time axis exactly one(two) year(s) before the failure date.
To correctly classify defaults, 1-year PDs should be above the chosen threshold to deﬁne
failure when crossing the dashed vertical line. Similarly, 2-year PDs should be greater
than the threshold when crossing the dotted vertical line. All the PD curves show rising
proﬁles before the companies went bankrupt, and are very high in the months before the
failure. From twelve to six months before failure the 1-year PD is always greater than
50.8 per cent, whereas from 24 to twelve months before failure the average PD is 29.1 per
cent.
6.2 Adding other Company Account Information
To compare the performance of our Merton approach with the information content of
company account data only, we estimate a probit model using company account data as
regressors. Here the dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value of unity if
the company went bankrupt, and zero otherwise. Given the concentration of defaulters
in the recession period, we also include in this probit model a macroeconomic indicator,
GDP, as an additional regressor. We test the power of PDs to explain company failure
by adding them to the probit model. If the coeﬃcient of the PD variable is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero after controlling for company account data, we can conclude that the
Merton approach adds value to the company account variables.
In Table 3 we collect the results from these models. We use diﬀerent measures of PDs for
robustness tests. When using 1-year PDs the company account data is lagged one year,
that is, it corresponds to the year before the default year —columns (1), (2) and (5). If
we include 2-year PDs in the probit estimation, we lag the company account data 2 years
12We choose this year because it is the year with the highest number of defaults (see Table 1).
9—columns (3) and (4). We always use the GDP of the year of default.
In column (1) of Table 3 we use the 1-year PD annual average. The results show that the
PD variable is signiﬁcant and that only one company account variable, the debt to assets
ratio, is signiﬁcant and at a lower level.13 The number of employees (included to account
for size) is marginally signiﬁcant. The variable accounting for the macroeconomic envi-
ronment is also signiﬁcant.14 The conclusion is that the PD variable contains information
over and above that included in publicly available company accounts.
In column (2) we re-estimate the model of column (1) excluding the PD variable. In-
terestingly, the proﬁtability measures are now signiﬁcant. Having negative proﬁt margins
instead of proﬁt margins greater than six per cent signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood of
failure. Proﬁt margins between zero and three per cent (instead of proﬁt margins greater
than six per cent) also increases the probability of failure. The coeﬃcient for this last
measure is, as expected, smaller than the coeﬃcient for negative proﬁt margins. The
coeﬃcient of proﬁt margins between three and six per cent is smaller than the two pre-
vious coeﬃcients but it is not signiﬁcant. If we compare these three coeﬃcients with the
ones in column (1) we clearly see the eﬀect of omitting the PD variable. In column (1)
these coeﬃcients were not signiﬁcant and did not have the correct signs or the expected
increasing-in-value pattern.
Moreover, the exclusion of the PD variable increases the signiﬁcance level of the debt
to assets ratio. The size and the macroeconomic variables are still signiﬁcant. It is inter-
esting to note that the constant is not signiﬁcant in the model of column (1), but becomes
signiﬁcant once we exclude the PD variable, signalling the better ﬁt of the model in col-
umn (1).
In the ﬁnal rows of Table 3 we report the average log-likelihood and the pseudo-R2 to
compare models. We include two measures of pseudo-R2 based on McFadden (1974) and
Cragg and Uhler (1970).15 Comparing the values for the average log-likelihood we see
that this is bigger for the model of column (1), that is the model that includes PDs as
regressor. Moreover, the pseudo-R2 of the model of column (1) is more than twice16 the
13The fact that the debt to asset ratio is signiﬁcant even controlling for PDs, which use a similar ratio
in their calculation, reveals a highly non-linear relationship between likelihood of default and the debt to
asset ratio.
14We have also included yearly dummy variables instead of the macroeconomic variable with 2001 as
the reference year. The dummies for the years 1990–92 and 1995 were signiﬁcant. If we include the
yearly dummies plus GDP, the yearly dummies are no longer signiﬁcant. We also tried GDP growth,
GDP deviation from its long-run trend, Industrial Production Index and its deviation from trend. All
these variables were signiﬁcant, but when included with the yearly dummies some of them were still
signiﬁcant. For this reason we report the results for the model that includes GDP (GDP=100 for 1995).
Diﬀerent measures of interest rates and prices were also included but failed to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
15For a discussion of these measures we refer the reader to Maddala (1983), pages 37–41.
16Strictly speaking one cannot compare R2’s across models with diﬀerent number of regressors since
the higher the number of regressors the higher the R2. Notwithstanding, we have excluded one variable
10pseudo-R2 for the model that excludes the PDs. Both statistics indicate, therefore, the
superiority of the ﬁrst model.
We run the model of column (1) by alternatively eliminating one defaulter at a time.
The aim of this exercise was to check if the results were driven by a possible outlier. Since
the results did not change substantially we can discard this possibility.
We also estimate the models of columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 for the years 1990–9317
one year at a time. The results remain broadly the same.
Columns (3) and (4) use information on PDs and company account data two years prior
to the year when the default occurred. We do this as a robustness check and to evaluate
the statistical power of 2-year PDs. The results are very similar to the ones of columns
(1) and (2).
The model of column (5) is as model (1) but with a diﬀerent PD variable. Here we
only take the information of the 1-year PD of the 12th month prior to the default month.
Even if the coeﬃcient for the PD measure is still signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcients for the ac-
counting variables (that collect information for twelve months instead of one month only
as the PD) are signiﬁcant: negative proﬁt margins and proﬁt margins between zero and
three per cent. Please note that the 1-year PD twelve months before failure is a measure
twelve months prior to the default month, whereas the accounting variables are simply
those of the year before failure. For negative proﬁt margins not being signiﬁcant we have
to include information on 1-year PD from twelve to ﬁve months before failure.
6.3 Power Curves and Accuracy Ratios
Figure 2 plots the power curve for some of the models estimated in this paper. The hy-
brid model is the model of column (1) in Table 3. Company account data is the model
of Table 3, column (2). The other three curves correspond to diﬀerent PD measures as
stated in the graph. The power curves of Figure 2 have been constructed for the same
proportion of defaulters in each model, which means that we can compare each curve with
the other. But it is not possible to compare power curves produced by other models that
use diﬀerent data sets (the same applies for the AR index).
Observing the diﬀerent curves we see that the hybrid model outperforms all other models.
The 1-year PD annual average is almost identical to the hybrid model at small proportions
of sample excluded. The model that uses only company account information is clearly
from our model (1) to check if the pseudo-R2 was still of the same order of magnitude. Even excluding
the GDP variable that has been proved to be highly signiﬁcant the MacFadden pseudo-R2 is 0.2785 (and
higher if we exclude one of the non-signiﬁcant variables). This exercise was undertaken for the rest of the
models presented in Table 3 and the same result applies. Therefore we are conﬁdent in the comparison
of pseudo-R2’s across speciﬁcations.
17The number of defaulters is too small for the individual years from 1994 to 2001 to obtain reliable
results.
11inferior to hybrid models or Merton models.
We also calculate the accuracy ratios for the models of Figure 2. Sobehart and Keenan
(2001) report the accuracy ratios for the KMV’s implementation of the Merton model
(using 1-year probabilities of default) and for a hybrid model as described in Sobehart
et al. (2000). These ratios are 69.0 per cent and 72.7 per cent, respectively. We can
use these ﬁgures as an approximate benchmark to evaluate the accuracy ratios calculated
for our models. The closest models to compare with those ﬁgures are the ones for the
1-year PD annual average and the hybrid model, that is, 76.7 per cent and 77.09 per cent,
respectively.
Comparing the accuracy ratios for the diﬀerent models, a reduced form model of the
type of Geroski and Gregg (1997) (accuracy ratio of 42 per cent) is easily outperformed
by a Merton approach (ratios between 53 to 77 per cent depending on the speciﬁc PD
measured considered), reﬂecting the information incorporated into market prices.18 The
jump in performance from a pure structural (Merton-based) approach to a hybrid model
(with a ratio of 77 per cent) is not as acute. One can always argue that this gap may
be enhanced by the inclusion of more accounting variables. But what is important here
is the existence of some information that is not captured by the Merton approach this
paper uses.
7 Conclusions
This paper describes the derivation of default probabilities from an extended version of
the Merton model and applies this to a number of UK non-ﬁnancial quoted companies
over the period 1990–2001.
The probability of default derived from our Merton model implementation provides a
strong signal of failure one year in advance of its occurrence. The mean value of the 1-
year PD annual average measure for our entire sample is 47.3 per cent for those companies
that went bankrupt, and 5.4 per cent for those that did not default. A more restrictive
probability of default measure shows a similar pattern. The mean value of the 1-year PD
for twelve months before the default date is 32.0 per cent for defaulters and 5.2 per cent
for non-defaulters.
Calculation of Type I and II errors suggests that PDs are successful in discriminating
between failing and non-failing ﬁrms. Using a threshold of ten per cent, that is, classify-
ing defaults as those ﬁrms with a 1-year PD greater or equal to ten per cent, the Type I
error is relatively modest at 9.2 per cent (with a Type II error of 15.0 per cent). For a
2-year PD measure the Type I and II errors for the same threshold are 12.3 and 29.9 per
18We use the terms reduced form and statistical models for those estimated models which are not based
on a theoretical model. The term structural model is applied to the estimated models which are derived
from a theoretical model, e.g. the Merton model.
12cent, respectively.
If we compare our model with a reduced form model of the type of Geroski and Gregg
(1997), we can state that the structural model (Merton approach) clearly outperforms the
reduced form model. This is independent of the speciﬁc PD measure, including the com-
parison of 2-year PDs and a statistical model that uses one-year lagged accounting ratios.
But it also shows that the hybrid models, i.e. those combining company account infor-
mation and the PDs derived from a Merton model, outperform pure structural models, if
only marginally.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Distribution of Defaults over Time
Whole Sample Estimation Sample
Year
Non-Defaults Defaults Non-Defaults Defaults
1990 412 13 410 9
1991 447 15 443 10
1992 474 13 471 13
1993 484 8 482 7
1994 498 3 495 3
1995 510 6 508 6
1996 554 3 552 3
1997 597 5 595 5
1998 667 4 664 3
1999 917 0 907 0
2000 996 2 816 2
2001 1078 4 1051 4
Total 7634 76 7394 65




5% 10% 15% 20% 30%
Whole Sample I 4.61 9.23 13.85 20.00 36.92
II 19.95 14.97 11.79 9.43 6.32
1990 I 0.00 22.22 22.22 33.33 33.33
II 20.24 14.15 10.73 8.05 5.37
1991 I 0.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00
II 31.83 26.86 22.12 18.51 13.54
1992 I 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.69 23.08
II 25.90 19.11 15.29 12.31 14.29
1993 I 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29
II 30.50 23.44 19.50 16.18 11.83
1994 I 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
II 17.17 11.92 9.09 6.87 4.44
1995 I 16.67 16.67 33.33 33.33 50.00
II 13.98 10.04 7.09 5.12 3.54
1996 I 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33
II 14.13 10.51 9.06 7.25 5.80
1997 I 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 60.00
II 14.45 11.43 8.57 6.55 3.70
1998 I 33.33 66.67 66.67 66.67 100.00
II 15.21 10.54 7.98 6.32 4.07
1999 I
II 19.07 14.55 11.47 9.26 6.06
2000 I 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
II 19.73 15.20 11.89 9.31 5.64
2001 I 0.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
II 21.60 15.70 12.18 9.99 6.47
11-year PD annual average is the average of the 1-year PD, —probability
of default in one year time from now— for the 12 months preceding the
default month.
15Table 3: Using Company Account Data1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.43 1.36¤¤ 0.89 1.53¤¤ 0.93
(0.64) (2.17) (1.29) (2.28) (1.46)
1-year PD annual average2 0.02¤¤¤
(11.03)
2-year PD annual average3 0.01¤¤¤
(5.90)
1-year PD 12 months 0.01¤¤¤
before failure4 (5.90)
Proﬁtability< 0% 0.17 0.68¤¤¤ 0.25 0.51¤¤¤ 0.49¤¤¤
(1.11) (5.00) (1.63) (3.51) (3.40)
0% <Proﬁtability< 3% 0.17 0.42¤¤¤ ¡0.09 0.11 0.30¤
(0.97) (2.81) (¡0.47) (0.59) (1.91)
3% <Proﬁtability< 6% ¡0.01 0.14 ¡0.04 0.07 0.07
(¡0.03) (0.92) (¡0.23) (0.48) (0.45)
Debt over assets 0.31¤¤ 0.48¤¤¤ 0.25¤¤ 0.33¤¤¤ 0.39¤¤¤
(2.52) (4.61) (2.37) (3.52) (2.99)
Cash over liabilities 0.01 ¡0.12 ¡0.04 ¡0.18 ¡0.07
(0.13) (¡1.18) (¡0.37) (¡1.38) (¡0.71)
log number of employees ¡0.6¤ ¡0.05¤ ¡0.04 ¡0.04 ¡0.05¤
(¡1.75) (¡1.66) (¡1.11) (¡1.45) (¡1.76)
Sales growth ¡0.11 ¡0.06 ¡0.16¤ ¡0.26¤¤¤ 0.00
(¡0.91) (¡0.44) (¡1.73) (¡2.98) (2.02)
GDP ¡0.03¤¤¤ ¡0.04¤¤¤ ¡0.04¤¤¤ ¡0.04¤¤¤ ¡0.03¤¤¤
(¡4.60) (¡6.18) (¡5.10) (¡5.81) (¡5.45)
Avg. Log-likelihood ¡0.034 ¡0.042 ¡0.040 ¡0.040 ¡0.041
McFadden Pseudo-R2 0.3105 0.1501 0.1787 0.1296 0.1878
Cragg & Uhler Pseudo-R2 0.2999 0.1438 0.1717 0.1246 0.1801
1Company Account Data is for the year before the default year for models using 1-year PDs, co-
lumns (1), (2) and (5) and 2 years before the default year for models using 2-year PDs, columns
(3) and (4). In this table we present the estimated coeﬃcients and the z-statistics in parenthesis.
¤¤¤,¤¤ and ¤ mean that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
21-year PD annual average is the average of the 1-year PD, —probability of default in one year
time from now— for the 12 months preceding the default month.
32-year PD annual average is the average of the 2-year PD, —probability of default in 2 years
time from now— from the 12th month before the default month to the 24th before the default
month.
41-year PD 12 months before failure is the 1-year PD for the 12th month before the default
month.
16Figure 1: Implied Probabilities of Default
17Figure 2: Power Curve
    Note: To plot the power curve, for a given model we rank the companies in our sample by
    risk score (PD) from the riskiest to the safest (horizontal axis). For a given percentage of this
    sample we calculate the number of defaulters included in that percentage as a proportion
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